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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW—THE EROSION OF POLITICAL ANONYMITY
AND ITS CHILLING EFFECT ON FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION: RECONSIDERING
THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE MANDATED PUBLIC DISCLOSURE OF
INDIVIDUALS’ POLITICAL DONATIONS
I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine the government placing you on a watchlist to monitor and record your political affiliations.1 Consider the ramifications of the government
keeping track of the candidates or groups that you support and then publishing that information on the World Wide Web for all to see.2 One does not
have to stray far into his or her imagination to realize these scenarios; they
are a reality in America today whenever someone chooses to donate more
than $200 to a political campaign for a federal election.3
Compelled public disclosure of personal identifying information of
those engaged in political speech is unconstitutional. The Supreme Court of
the United States has repeatedly recognized that state action that has a
chilling effect on freedom of association is equally as unconstitutional as
state action outright prohibiting protected speech.4 The aggregation and subsequent publication of data concerning citizens’ political affiliations are
perhaps two of the most patently obvious cases of government action that
has the potential to curb freedom of association. Historically, government
lists of political opponents have laid a bedrock for tyranny and provided
avenues for the oppression of political, religious, and racial minorities.5 Federal law that requires the maintenance and administration of databases recording individuals’ political beliefs and preferences runs afoul of the
1. See 52 U.S.C. § 30104(b)(3)(A) (2018) (requiring government collection and public
disclosure of all donors and their personal identifying information who donate over $200 to a
federal election campaign).
2. See, e.g., Nick Gillespie, Does Mozilla Dumping Its CEO Over Prop 8/Anti-GayMarriage Stance = McCarthyism?, REASON (April 6, 2014, 12:39 PM), https://reason.com/
2014/04/06/does-mozilla-dumping-its-ceo-over-prop-8.
3. 52 U.S.C. § 30104(b)(3)(A) (2018).
4. See, e.g., Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 523–24 (1960).
5. See, e.g., Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60, 64 (1960) (“Persecuted groups and sects
from time to time throughout history have been able to criticize oppressive practices and laws
either anonymously or not at all.”); NAACP v. Ala. ex rel Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 462
(1958) (“[C]ompelled disclosure of [political affiliations] . . . [is akin to the] requirement that
adherents of particular religious faiths or political parties wear identifying arm-bands.”); Am.
Civil Liberties Union of Nevada v. Heller, 378 F.3d 979, 981 (9th Cir. 2004) (discussing that
“[e]ven the Federalist Papers, written in favor of the adoption of our Constitution, were published under fictitious names. It is plain that anonymity has sometimes been assumed for the
most constructive purposes.”) (quoting Talley, 362 U.S. at 64–65).
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American tradition of anonymity in political activism and advocacy.6 In
order to preserve a competitive political marketplace and safeguard the
speech that the First Amendment intended to most robustly protect, the Supreme Court must reconsider the constitutionality of compelled public disclosure laws.
Part II of this note discusses the history of political anonymity and its
role in First Amendment jurisprudence. Part III argues that strict scrutiny
must be applied to any law compelling the disclosure of individuals’ political contributions because of disclosure’s burden on free speech and freedom
of association. Part IV discusses how compelled disclosure creates a chilling
effect that restricts individuals’ freedom of speech and association and how
the disclosure requirement is akin to impermissible government compelled
speech. Part V considers the costs of these burdens by examining data and
anecdotes showing that compelled disclosures lead to harassment, intimidation, and retaliation against those who hold minority or controversial political views. Lastly, Part VI proposes that the enforcement of the anti-bribery
laws already in effect provides a way for the government to sufficiently protect the integrity of America’s elections without burdening the First
Amendment.
II. ANONYMITY IS AS AMERICAN AS APPLE PIE — A HISTORY OF THE
COURT’S BALANCING OF ANONYMOUS SPEECH AND THE FIRST
AMENDMENT
Campaign finance restrictions are not newfound phenomena; Congress
first sought to regulate campaign financing with the Tillman Act in 1907.7
The seminal piece of legislation, however, came in 1971 with the Federal
Election Campaign Act (FECA), which has since been amended several
times.8 Even though the intention of these laws was to weed out corruption
in national elections, inherent in the regulations is the unmasking of individuals’ private political beliefs.9 Political affiliations do not simply tell of
one’s political party membership; they can reveal the most personal and
intimate details of one’s personal life—ranging from religious beliefs to
sexual orientation.10
Anonymous speech played an important role in the efforts to establish
the Republic. It was used to encourage candid debate amongst the colonists,
6. See, e.g. Talley, 362 U.S. at 64; Patterson, 357 U.S. at 462; Heller, 378 F.3d at 981.
7. THE HERITAGE GUIDE TO THE CONSTITUTION 89 (David Forte & Matthew Spalding
eds. 2d 3d. 2014) (discussing Tillman Act of 1907, 34 Stat. 864 (1907)).
8. Id.
9. Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (1972) (codified at 52 U.S.C. § 30104(b)(3)(A)
(2018)).
10. See Talley, 362 U.S. at 64.
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as well as to protect those colonists’ identities from the Crown.11 The Federalist Papers were published under a pseudonym, “Publius.”12 Anonymous
publications continued after the ratification of the Constitution, including
efforts to defend and criticize certain aspects of the document.13 The Supreme Court had not considered a question of anonymous speech until Lewis
Publishing Co. v. Morgan during World War I.14 A newspaper’s editors and
shareholders wished to remain anonymous but also sought to qualify for a
less costly type of postage to mail out the newspaper.15 The Court held that
the government had an interest in unmasking the editors and shareholders of
the newspaper, and that the unmasking was “incidental” to the newspaper
gaining the special second-class postage status.16 In vindicating an effort by
the state to mimic the tactics of King George III against the colonies, the
Court established in Lewis Publishing Co. that it was permissible for the
government to require citizens to bargain away their First Amendment rights
in order to receive certain benefits.17
Over forty years later, the Court considered anonymity and disclosure
of political identity in United States v. Harriss, in which it upheld a law requiring lobbyists to register with the government before becoming involved
with any political efforts.18 The Court acknowledged that “as a practical
matter . . . [the statute acts] as a deterrent to [unincluded lobbyists] exercis[ing] [their] First Amendment rights,” but the Court also found that the
restriction was “too remote [from an individual’s rights] to require striking
down [the] statute.”19 Consequently, the Court once again favored the government when balancing the government’s interests with citizens’ fundamental rights, and the prospect of preserving political anonymity that the
Founders sought to protect in the First Amendment appeared to be a long
lost hope.20

11. See, e.g., Victoria Smith Ekstrand & Cassandra Imfeld Jeyaram, Our Founding
Anonymity: Speech During the Constitutional Debate, 28 AM. JOURNALISM 35, 53 (2011)
(discussing how the founders’ efforts would have been substantially inhibited in their efforts
without the safeguard of anonymity).
12. Chesa Boudin, Note, Publius and the Petition: Doe v. Reed and the History of
Anonymous Speech, 120 YALE L.J. 2140, 2153 (2011).
13. See generally George H. Carr, Application of the U.S. Supreme Court Doctrine to
Anonymity in the Networld, 44 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 524 (1996).
14. See 229 U.S. 288 (1913).
15. Id. at 304.
16. Id. at 315.
17. See id.
18. 347 U.S. 612, 625 (1954).
19. Id. at 626.
20. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14 (1976) (explaining that “there is practically universal agreement that a major purpose of [the First Amendment] was to protect the free discussion of governmental affairs.”) (quoting Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966)).
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However, the Court vindicated the First Amendment’s protection of
political anonymity in NAACP v. Ala. ex rel. Patterson.21 There, the State of
Alabama attempted to compel the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) to disclose its membership lists before it
could qualify under the state’s business corporation laws.22 In a unanimous
opinion, the Court struck down the law and held that “compelled disclosure
of affiliation with groups engaged in advocacy may constitute [an] effective
. . . restraint on freedom of association.”23 This foundational case recognized
that compelled disclosure of political affiliation violates the First Amendment’s protection of freedom of association.24 The Court considered this
issue again two years later and, relying heavily on the reasoning of Patterson, reiterated that compelled disclosure of political affiliation is unconstitutional.25
When the Supreme Court struck down a statute that required the names
and addresses of authors to be printed on any political handbills distributed
in the town in Talley v. California, it was the first time the Court acknowledged the close relationship between anonymity and freedom of speech.26
Writing for the majority, Justice Black noted that “there are times and circumstances when States may not compel members of groups engaged in the
dissemination of ideas to be publicly identified . . . [because] identification
and fear of reprisal might deter perfectly peaceful discussions of public matters of importance.”27 The Court’s reasoning in Talley laid the foundation for
subsequent cases that challenged laws for being excessively burdensome on
freedom of association.28 These subsequent cases almost exclusively involved political speech and association and proved prescient by noting the
consequences of individuals’ private political affiliations.29
As the Supreme Court continued to expand the protections afforded
under the First Amendment, it was not long before campaign finance laws

21. 357 U.S. at 466.
22. Patterson, 357 U.S. at 451.
23. Id. at 462.
24. See id.
25. Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 523 (1960).
26. Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60, 65 (1960).
27. Id.
28. See, e.g., Communist Party of U.S. v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 367 U.S. 1,
70 (1961); Louisiana ex rel. Gremillion v. NAACP, 366 U.S. 293, 297 (1961); Plante v.
Gonzalez, 575 F.2d 1119, 1132 (5th Cir. 1978); Donohoe v. Duling, 465 F.2d 196, 205 n. 2
(4th Cir. 1972) (Winter, J., dissenting); Am. Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey v. New
Jersey Election Law Enforcement Comm’n, 509 F. Supp. 1123, 1126 (D.N.J. 1981).
29. James Bopp, Jr. & Josiah Neeley, How Not to Reform Judicial Elections: Davis,
White, and the Future of Judicial Campaign Financing, 86 DENV. U. L. REV. 195, 218–19
(2008).
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were subjected to similar challenges.30 In Buckley v. Valeo, the plaintiffs
challenged a federal law regulating both anonymity in campaign donations
and contribution limits.31 It challenged, inter alia, the Federal Election
Campaign Act’s requirement that a candidate disclose the identity of any
person who donates $100 or more to his or her campaign.32 The Court conceded that the requirement was a serious inhibition on the freedom of
speech: “[w]e are not unmindful that the damage done by disclosure of the
associational interests of the minor parties and their members and to supporters of independents could be significant.”33 However, the Court upheld
the law by finding a compelling government interest in preventing corruption or the appearance of it,34 despite conceding that “[t]here could well be a
case . . . where the threat to the exercise of the First Amendment is so serious [that] the state interest furthered by disclosure [is] so insubstantial that
the [disclosure] requirement cannot be constitutionally applied.”35 This left
the door open for further challenges of compelled disclosure laws.
The next challenge came in McIntyre v. Ohio Election Commission,36
and its holding solidified the protection of anonymous speech in First
Amendment jurisprudence.37 The plaintiff in McIntyre challenged an Ohio
statute that prohibited the distribution of anonymous campaign literature
advocating for the election or defeat of any candidate or the adoption or
defeat of any particular issue.38 Violators were fined $100.39 In a 7-2 opinion, the Court found the Ohio statute unconstitutional, holding that the ability to speak anonymously is an important aspect of political advocacy because a person’s decision whether or not to engage in political speech “may
be motivated by fear of economic or official retaliation, by concern about
social ostracism, or merely by a desire to preserve as much of one’s privacy
30. If the Court was willing to grant free speech protections to pornography, it should be
willing to recognize that political speech, which is at the heart of the First Amendment, deserves similar robust protections. See McConnell v. Federal Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93,
248 (2003) (Scalia, J., concurring in part) (“Who could have imagined that the same Court
which, within the past four years, has sternly disapproved of restrictions upon such inconsequential forms of expression as virtual child pornography . . . would smile with favor upon a
law that cuts to the heart of what the First Amendment is meant to protect.”).
31. 424 U.S. 1, 6–7 (1976).
32. Id. at 74–76.
33. Id. at 71 (internal citations omitted).
34. Id. at 69–70.
35. Id.
36. 514 U.S. 334 (1995).
37. Jason Shepard & Genelle Belmas, Anonymity, Disclosure and First Amendment
Balancing in the Internet Era: Developments in Libel, Copyright, and Election Speech, 15
YALE J.L. & TECH. 92, 103 (Winter 2012-2013).
38. McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 338 n. 3.
39. Id.
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as possible.”40 Disclosing individuals’ associations can contribute to pervasive instances of political harassment and threats, and protecting Americans
from involuntary disclosure of their political affiliations is the only way to
guard against that.41 When balancing the interest of the government with the
fundamental rights of the citizenry, a greater weight must be afforded “to the
value of the free speech than the dangers of its misuse.”42
Nevertheless, when faced with an issue implicating similar interests in
Doe v. Reed, the Supreme Court declined to extend its reasoning in McIntyre to a Washington law requiring the disclosure of identifying information
for those signing direct referendum petitions.43 In Doe, the court held that
the state had a sufficient interest in preventing fraud and discarding invalid
signatures, finding specifically that disclosure “helps prevent certain types
of petition fraud otherwise difficult to detect, such as outright forgery and
‘bait and switch’ fraud, in which an individual signs the petition based on a
misrepresentation of the underlying issue.”44 In his dissent, Justice Thomas
explained how “the Washington Public Records Act severely burdens [First
Amendment] rights and chills citizens’ participation in the referendum process.”45 He decries the majority’s reasoning as a departure from the precedent set in previous decisions holding that anonymity is paramount in the
political process.46 However, the majority was unpersuaded and found that
the state had a compelling interest to disclose the identities of individuals
who signed the direct referendum petitions, distinguishing, in part, a direct
referendum from other aspects of the electoral process.47
Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission has recently become
the focus for those both opposed to and in favor of lesser restrictions in
campaign finance.48 In Citizens United, the Court tackled the question of
whether individuals organized and acting in groups are afforded the same
First Amendment protections as an individual contributing to a political
cause by himself.49 Analyzing the history and importance of individuals organizing to advocate for certain positions, the Court recognized “that independent expenditures, including those made by corporations, do not give
rise to corruption or the appearance of corruption.”50 In its holding, the ma40. Id. at 341–42.
41. Id. at 357 (“Anonymity is a shield from tyranny of the majority.”).
42. Id.
43. 561 U.S. 186, 200–01 (2010).
44. Id. at 198–99.
45. Id. at 229 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
46. Id. at 232.
47. Id. at 198–99, 201 (accepting the state’s argument that weeding out potential fraud
was a compelling interest sufficient to burden the plaintiffs’ First Amendment rights).
48. 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
49. Id. at 319.
50. Id. at 357.
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jority discussed the unlikelihood that individual political donations contribute to a rampant pervasiveness of fraudulent electioneering or corruption—
the sine qua non of the argument by those defending compelled disclosure
laws.51 Absent this compelling governmental interest, which the Court cited
in previous cases as the dispositive reason for upholding other restrictions
on political contributions, further challenges to these laws should no longer
fail on the specious claims of limiting nefarious political influence.52
III. CONSTITUTIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
Laws that impose cavalier regulations and restrictions on campaign
contributions unquestionably burden the First Amendment rights of free
speech and freedom of association.53 Strict scrutiny applies to laws that burden “core political speech.”54 Exacting scrutiny, sometimes referenced in
First Amendment cases, effectively operates as strict scrutiny.55 For a law
burdening political contributions to withstand a challenge, it “must advance
a sufficiently important state interest and employ means closely drawn to
avoid unnecessary abridgment of First Amendment freedoms.”56
A.

Courts Must Apply Strict Scrutiny When Analyzing Compelled Disclosure Laws

Allegations of corruption are repeatedly cited as the primary need for
the individual disclosure requirement.57 The Supreme Court has recognized
51. See id.
52. See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 71 (1976); see also Citizens United, 558
U.S. at 480 (Thomas, J., dissenting in part) in which Justice Thomas stated in part that:
Congress may not abridge the right to anonymous speech based on the simple interest in providing voters with additional relevant information. In continuing to
hold otherwise, the Court misapprehends the import of recent events that
some amici describe in which donors to certain causes were blacklisted, threatened, or otherwise targeted for retaliation. (internal quotations and citations omitted).
53. McCutcheon v. FEC, 572 U.S. 185, 196–97 (2014).
54. McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 347 (“When a law burdens core political speech, we apply
exacting scrutiny, and we uphold the restriction only if it is narrowly tailored to serve an
overriding state interest.”) (internal quotations omitted).
55. First Nat. Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 786 (1978).
56. Free & Fair Election Fund v. Mo. Ethics Comm’n, 903 F.3d 759, 763 (8th Cir.
2018). As compared to the traditional strict scrutiny test that requires that a statute be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest to overcome a First Amendment challenge. See,
e.g., Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 765 (2002).
57. Jennifer A. Heerwig & Katherine Shaw, Through a Glass, Darkly: The Rhetoric and
Reality of Campaign Finance Disclosure, 102 Geo. L.J. 1443, 1466–70 (2014).
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that preventing the corruption, or the appearance of it, is the only state interest that can support a limitation on campaign contributions.58 To justify the
burden on First Amendment rights that disclosure requirements create, the
government must demonstrate a substantial risk that campaign contributions
give rise to the “direct exchange of an official act for money” or the appearance of such.59 However, any evidence reflecting the pervasiveness of such
corruption is wanting. Not only that, there is no empirical or anecdotal suggestion otherwise that these types of disclosure requirements would quell
such corruption if it was in fact reality.60 Mere conjecture that a possibility
of corruption exists is insufficient to justify a law burdening the First
Amendment.61 Actual evidence of corruption is required because
mere “[r]eliance on a generic favoritism or influence theory . . . is at odds
with standard First Amendment analyses because it is unbounded and susceptible to no limiting principle.”62
Often, proponents of campaign finance reform claim that Buckley affords the government the prerogative to impose whatever restrictions may
be necessary if it can articulate an interest in preventing corruption.63 However, Buckley is no example to cite in favor of onerous campaign finance
restrictions—it actually struck down a majority of the restrictions challenged
in that case as violative of the First Amendment.64 Even if the government
could demonstrate a substantial risk of quid pro quo corruption, or the appearance of quid pro quo corruption resulting from contributions made to
political campaigns, the involuntary public disclosure of an individual’s
political affiliations is not narrowly tailored enough to avoid unnecessary
abridgment of First Amendment freedoms.65
To the chagrin of some supporters of campaign finance restrictions, the
issue is not split along traditional liberal or conservative lines as demonstrated by Buckley where two of the plaintiffs, Senator James L. Buckley
58. McCutcheon, 572 U.S. at 192 (citing Davis v. FEC, 554 U.S. 724, 741 (2008)); see
also FEC v. National Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480, 496-97 (1985)).
59. McCutcheon, 572 U.S. at 192; see also Free & Fair Election Fund, 903 F.3d at 764.
60. See Jeffery Milyo, Do Campaign Contributions Corrupt Politics?, INDEPENDENT
INSTITUTE (Oct. 25, 1999), https://www.independent.org/news/article.asp?id=448 (suggesting
that lobbying efforts persuade politicians far more than campaign donations do).
61. Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 392 (2000).
62. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 359 (2010).
63. See, e.g., Brief for Respondent at 37–38, Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310
(2010) (No. 08-205).
64. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 39–59, 143 (1976). The case struck down provisions
that limited expenditures by candidates on their own behalf, that limited total expenditures in
various campaigns, and that limited the amount that any individual could spend, independently of, but relative to, a candidate. Id. at 143.
65. Doe v. Reed, 561 U.S. 186, 246–37 (2010) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (explaining that
Washington’s disclosure laws are not narrowly tailored because of less restrictive means that
were in place to achieve the same ends).
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and Senator Eugene McCarthy, represented both major political parties.66
Both Buckley and McCarthy were able to run successful campaigns as underdog politicians challenging incumbents only because of the support of
well-funded donors.67 Accordingly, they saw the 1974 amendments to
FECA as an attempt by Congress to protect incumbents, not to curb corruption in federal elections.68 As Senator—and now Judge—Buckley discussed
in his book, Saving Congress From Itself, “[i]ncumbents enjoy enormous
advantages over challengers,” and for there to be a healthy democracy, there
needs to be competition in the political marketplace, which can only be accomplished by having enough capital to run a campaign.69 They saw FECA
as covert way to protect incumbent politicians under the guise of preserving
electoral integrity.70
Even though there is bipartisan support of FECA—including its compelled disclosure requirements—opposition to it also crosses party lines.
Senator Buckley claims the best protection against corruption that may stem
from heightened or limitless contribution limits is the compelled disclosure
requirement; yet, he recognizes that the disclosure law as written sets the
minimum amount far too low and impermissibly burdens the electorate’s
First Amendment freedoms.71 Furthermore, Justice Scalia famously claimed,
in an interview after Citizens United, that any concerns over corporate contributions should be quelled, or at least mitigated, because of the compelled
disclosure requirement.72 However, as this note will show, a law that is burdensome on the First Amendment cannot withstand judicial scrutiny just
because it may be a prudent policy choice or enjoys bipartisan support.73
When it comes to the First Amendment, the fit of the regulation is of
utmost importance—regardless of whether a law is subject to strict or mere-

66. Hon. James L. Buckley, SAVING CONGRESS FROM ITSELF 72–73 (2014). Senator
Buckley was the first third-party candidate to be elected to the Senate in forty years, and
Senator McCarthy challenged Lyndon Johnson in the 1968 Democratic presidential primary,
causing the incumbent president to withdraw from the race—both of whom only acquired the
means to do so by committed individual donors. Id.
67. Id.
68. See id. at 73.
69. Id.
70. See id.
71. Id. at 75–77.
72. Interview with Antonin Scalia, Assoc. Justice, Supreme Court of the United States,
in Washington, D.C. (July 19, 2012) [hereinafter Scalia Interview].
73. See, e.g., Satellite Broad. and Commc’ns Ass’n v. FCC., 275 F.3d 337, 356 (4th Cir.
2001) (“If a regulation places even incidental burdens on speech without yielding some genuine benefit, it must be struck down.”); Morrill v. Weaver, 224 F. Supp. 2d 882, 900 (E.D. Pa.
2002)
(If a law “unconstitutionally burdens core First Amendment expression and association . . . it
must be struck down.”).

312

UA LITTLE ROCK LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43

ly exacting scrutiny.74 Laws limiting campaign contributions must therefore
employ means “narrowly tailored to achieve the desired objective.”75
FECA’s compelled disclosure, however, inhibits far more expressive conduct than necessary for any conceivable corruption-fighting purpose.76 Because the Supreme Court has rejected the argument that the mere speculation that corruption may occur is a sufficient interest to uphold a law that
treads upon First Amendment rights, the proffered concerns of potential
corruption are too attenuated to justify this type of burden.77
Voter’s privacy has long been recognized as a fundamental aspect of
Americans’ exercising their right to vote.78! “[T]he respected tradition of
anonymity in the advocacy of political causes . . . is best exemplified by the
[use of the] secret ballot . . . to vote one’s conscience without fear of retaliation.”79! Even though a donation is not a vote, the two are so closely related
that revealing one would be tantamount to revealing the other; when one
donates to a politician, it is almost certain that a vote for that politician will
follow.80
B.

Compelled Disclosure of One’s Political Affiliations Is Akin to Unconstitutional Compelled Speech

The government may not force individuals to espouse a certain viewpoint or idea.81 Inherent in the First Amendment’s protection of the freedom
of speech is the right for the individual to voluntarily choose what to say and
how he says it without government force or fear of the government criminal74. McCutcheon v. FEC, 572 U.S. 185, 218 (2014).
75. Id. (quoting Bd. of Trustees of State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480 (1989))
(internal quotations omitted).
76. See 52 U.S.C. § 30104(b)(3)(A) (considering the evidence of the chilling effect that
compelled disclosure has on protected political speech, statutes expressly preventing a quid
pro quo exchange of money for a particular vote or policy position—e.g. federal anti-bribery
laws—would be the appropriately narrowly tailored way to prevent the corruption that the
compelled disclosure law claims to combat).
77. McCutcheon, 572 U.S. at 218 (“This sort of speculation, however, cannot justify the
substantial intrusion on First Amendment rights at issue in this case.”); Free & Fair Election
Fund v. Mo. Ethics Comm’n, 903 F.3d 759, 764 (8th Cir. 2018) (“The transfer ban, however,
does little, if anything, to further the objective of preventing corruption or the appearance of
corruption. The Commission does not provide any real-world examples of circumvention
along the lines of its hypothetical.”) (internal quotations and citations omitted).
78. Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 206 (1992) (“[A]ll 50 states, together with numerous other Western democracies . . . [secure the right of] a secret ballot . . . in order to
serve the . . . compelling interest [of] preventing . . . intimidation.”) (emphasis added).
79. McIntyre v. Ohio Election Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 343 (1998).
80. Fred Bernstein, An Online Peek at Your Politics, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 4, 2000),
https://www.nytimes.com/2000/10/04/opinion/an-online-peek-at-your-politics.html.
81. Rumsfeld v. Forum for Acad. & Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 61 (2006).
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izing that choice.82 Even in times of war, the First Amendment still prohibits
the government from compelling individuals to publicly express a political
viewpoint.83 When questions of compelled speech arise, the deciding factor
is the voluntariness of the speech, not its sincerity.84 Accordingly, when the
government compels someone to publicly express an idea that he or she has
no desire to reveal, it is impermissibly compelled speech.85
The government compels someone to speak publicly about his or her
beliefs when it mandates the disclosure of political contributions, which “in
itself . . . seriously infringe[s] on privacy of association and belief guaranteed by the First Amendment.”86! There is no readily distinguishable characteristic between political donations and political membership: “the invasion
of privacy of belief may be as great when the information sought concerns
[political donations] as when it concerns the joining of organizations.”87
Compelling individuals to publicize their political affiliations forces them to
engage in speech that may prove to be against their own interests. Noting
the chilling effect that those disclosures may have on participation in the
political process, courts have recognized the potential for harassment, intimidation, and retaliation that could stem from individuals having their priorpolitical affiliations examined and scrutinized.88
Compelled disclosure affords those who want to be involved in political activism with two options: submit to the publication of your political
affiliations or do not participate in political speech at all.89 This is all too
similar to the monarchical license to speak imposed on the colonists by the
Crown that the First Amendment intended to protect against.90! “[T]he inter82. Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977).
83. West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) (“If there is
any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or
force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein.”) (emphasis added).
84. Id at 641–42.
85. See id.
86. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 64 (1976).
87. Id. at 66.
88. See, e.g., DeGregory v. Att’y Gen. of N.H., 383 U.S. 825, 828–29 (1966) (holding
that a professor could refuse to disclose political associations because the “realm of political
and associational privacy protected by the First Amendment” was not overcome by a compelling state interest); Pleasant v. Lovell, 876 F.2d 787, 795 (10th Cir. 1989) (protecting from
disclosure advocacy concerning modification to tax laws); FEC v. Machinists Non-Partisan
Political League, 655 F.2d 380, 384, 388 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (protecting documents related to
“political expression and association,” including communications regarding decisions to
support or oppose political candidates).
89. See 52 U.S.C. § 30104(b)(3)(a).
90. Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60, 64–65 (1960) (“The obnoxious press licensing law
of England, which was also enforced on the Colonies was due in part to the knowledge that
exposure of the names of printers, writers and distributors would lessen the circulation of
literature critical of the government. The old seditious libel cases in England show the
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est in having anonymous [political speech in] the marketplace of ideas unquestionably outweighs any public interest in requiring disclosure as a condition of entry,” which suggests that any burden on political speech that
leads to disclosure is unconstitutional on its face.91
IV. THE REALIZATION OF COSTS FROM COMPELLED DISCLOSURE
The Institute for Justice, a public interest law firm, conducted a study
in 2007 to determine what the effect might be on an individual’s decision to
donate after being made aware of the disclosure requirements.92 The study
found that eighty percent of respondents supported the general idea of public
disclosure for those who contribute to a political campaign.93 However, upon
respondents’ learning that their names and addresses would be included in
that information, support dropped to forty percent.94 Only twenty-four percent supported employers’ names being included in the disclosure.95 Lastly,
and most telling of the chilling effect that compelled disclosure creates, sixty percent of respondents said that they would think twice about donating to
a political movement upon learning that they were compelled to disclose
their names and addresses to the public.96 Respondents cited various reasons
for their desire not to have their political affiliations publicized, including
fear of retaliation, which demonstrates that disclosure laws could potentially
discourage more than half of the citizenry from becoming politically active.97
More recently, a study similarly found that sixty-two percent of Americans have political views that they are afraid to share.98 Though Republicans
make up the vast majority of individuals who feel the need to hide their polengths to which government had to go to find out who was responsible for books that were
obnoxious to the rulers . . . [causing the Founders to] frequently [have] to conceal their authorship or distribution of literature that easily could have brought down on them prosecutions by English-controlled courts.”).
91. McIntyre v. Ohio Election Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 342 (1998) (emphasis added).
Although the Court appears to limit this specific holding to literary works, its reasoning can
equally apply to other forms of political speech.
92. Dick M. Carpenter II, Disclosure Costs: Unintended Consequences of Campaign
Finance
Reform,
Institute
for
Justice
(March,
2007),
https://ij.org/wpcontent/uploads/2015/03/DisclosureCosts.pdf.
93. Id. at 7.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id at 8.
98. Emily Ekins, Poll: 62% of Americans Have Political Views They’re Afraid to Share,
Cato Institute (July 22, 2020), https://www.cato.org/publications/survey-reports/poll-62americans-say-they-have-political-views-theyre-afraid-share. In 2017, 58 percent of Americans had political views that they were afraid to share. Id.
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litical views (seventy-seven percent), fifty-nine percent of independents and
fifty-two percent of Democrats share this fear.99 This creates a pervasive
practice of self-censorship among Americans, which appears to be somewhat well-founded.100 For example, the survey found that twenty-two percent of Americans would support firing a business executive who donates to
Joe Biden’s campaign, while thirty-one percent would support firing a business executive who donates to Donald Trump’s campaign.101 Among those
who identify as “strong liberals,” support for firing a business executive
who donates to Trump increases to fifty percent, while thirty-six percent of
“strong conservatives” would support similar retribution for a business executive who donates to Biden.102
As a result of what appears to be a growing trend of retaliation based
on political affiliation, thirty-two percent of employed Americans fear that
the revelation of their political opinions would result in either “missing out
on career opportunities or losing their jobs.”103 The study notes that this statistic is particularly worrisome “given that most personal campaign contributions to political candidates are public knowledge and can easily be found
online.”104 These concerns cross party lines: thirty-eight percent of Republicans, thirty-one percent of independents, and twenty-eight percent of Democrats feel that simply holding certain political opinions could negatively
impact their careers.105!
Although surveys like these cannot precisely reflect the actual consequences of such laws, real world examples of retaliation and harassment
show that the survey revealing respondents’ aversions to disclosure was not
unsubstantiated.106 Take, for example, some of the most well-known instances of political unmasking over the last decade. Stop Huntington Animal
Cruelty (SHAC) targeted Gigi Brienza, a donor to the John Edwards campaign in 2004, by releasing her name and address on a list of targets because
of her employer’s contract with Huntington Labs.107 The FBI—which was
investigating the target list because the FBI considered SHAC to be “one of
the most serious domestic terrorism threats” in 2005—confirmed that SHAC
pulled Brienza’s personal identifying information from the FEC’s website.108
99. Id.
100. See id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Ekins, supra note 98.
105. Id.
106. See, e.g., McConnell v. FEC, 251 F. Supp. 2d. 176, 227–29 (D.D.C. 2003).
107. Gigi Brienza, I Got Inspired. I Gave. Then I Got Scared., WASH. POST (July 1,
2007),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2007/06/29/AR200706290
2264.html.
108. Id.
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During the campaign for Proposition 8 in California (a referendum legalizing gay marriage), state law required the disclosure of any individual donating over $100 to the cause opposing the proposition, which consequently led
to many supporters suffering “property damage, or threats of physical violence or death.”109
Furthermore, a list of attendees of a fundraiser for President Trump in
Hollywood was publicized in an attempt to make sure they are willing to be
“publicly proud” of their support, and Representative Juaquin Castro’s social media post of Trump donors in San Antonio resulted in those targeted
having their businesses boycotted and families harassed.110 Inherent in the
compelled disclosure of political donations is the fact that donors are now
open to retaliation for their private political beliefs. This unwanted release
of information is made possible solely by the government’s compilation and
publication of their names coupled with their politics.111 These examples are
simply illustrative and not exhaustive of the retaliation and harassment that
individuals face from public disclosure of political donations. This illustrative list, however, should be sufficient to convince a court of “a reasonable
probability that the compelled disclosure of personal information will subject [all donors] to threats, harassment, or reprisals from either Government
officials or private parties,” which should lay a convincing foundation for
prevailing in an effort to resist disclosure.112
Neither size nor popularity of a political movement should factor into
its need for anonymity because “whether a group is popular or unpopular,
the right of privacy implicit in the First Amendment creates an area into
which the Government may not enter.”113 “Inviolability of privacy in group
association may in many circumstances be indispensable to preservation of
109. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 481 (2010) (Thomas, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
110. See, e.g., Caitlin O’Kane, Debra Messing Demands Attendee List for Beverly Hills
Trump Fundraiser, President Hits Back, CBS NEWS (Sept. 2, 2019),
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/trump-fundraiser-beverly-hills-debra-messing-demandsattendee-list-for-fundraiser-event-president-hits-back-today/; see also Michael Brice-Sadler
& Alex Horton, Joaquin Castro Tweeted the Names of Top Trump Donors. Republicans Say
it will Encourage Violence., WASH. POST (Aug. 7, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
politics/2019/08/07/joaquin-castro-tweeted-names-top-trump-donors-republicans-say-it-willincite-violence/.
111. See 52 U.S.C. § 30104(b)(3)(A) (2018). Though many individuals are fully content
with publicly exclaiming their political affiliations, the unconstitutional chilling effect of
disclosure concerns those who do not want their political opinions publicly known. Thus,
public dissemination of private political affiliations is solely a result of the compelled disclosure law if someone chooses not to reveal his or her affiliations otherwise. See 52 U.S.C. §
30104(b)(3)(A).
112. Doe v. Reed, 561 U.S. 186, 200 (2010) (internal quotations and alterations omitted).
113. Gibson v. Fla. Legis. Investigation Comm’n, 372 U.S. 539, 570 (1963) (Douglas, J.,
concurring).
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freedom of association, particularly where a group espouses dissident beliefs,”—and in today’s political climate many view any opposing view as
dissident.114! Because “identification and fear of reprisal might deter perfectly
peaceful discussions of public matters of importance,” it is important that
courts recognize the growing volatility and aggressiveness present in today’s
political climate.115! Consider:!
A soldier who donates to pro-gay causes may risk being discharged under the military’s Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell policy. A union member or corporate employee may risk ostracism or be denied advancement if he or
she contributes to candidates or causes not in line with those of management. Businessmen and other professionals may not want to alienate
potential customers, and those whose careers depend on reputation and
avoiding controversy, such as doctors, ministers, or journalists, may not
wish to have their political views publicly advertised. The risk of retaliation is particularly acute for individuals who contribute to unpopular or
unconventional causes and candidates.116

In one of the first challenges to a disclosure law, the Court discussed
the difficulties that minority political parties face in particular:
The District Court found “substantial evidence of both governmental and
private hostility toward and harassment of SWP [Socialist Workers Party] members and supporters.” Appellees introduced proof of specific incidents of private and government hostility toward the SWP and its
members within the four years preceding the trial. These incidents, many
of which occurred in Ohio and neighboring states, included threatening
phone calls and hate mail, the burning of SWP literature, the destruction
of SWP members’ property, police harassment of a party candidate, and
the firing of shots at an SWP office. There was also evidence that in the
12-month period before trial 22 SWP members, including four in Ohio,
were fired because of their party membership. Although appellants contend that two of the Ohio firings were not politically motivated, the evidence amply supports the District Court’s conclusion that “private hostility and harassment toward SWP members make it difficult for them to
maintain employment.”117

However, minority political movements are no longer the only groups
facing this type of harassment stemming from publicized political affiliations.118
114.
115.
116.
117.
(1982).
118.

NAACP v. Ala. ex Rel Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 462 (1958).
Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60, 65 (1960).
Bopp, supra note 24, at 218–19 (internal quotations and footnotes omitted).
Brown v. Socialist Workers ‘74 Campaign Comm. (Ohio), 459 U.S. 87, 98–99
See, e.g., O’Kane, supra note 96.
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In McConnell v. FEC, the district court detailed anecdotes of these real
world consequences, including individuals having to contribute less than the
amount that triggered disclosure because of fear of retaliation by employers,
neighbors, and others.119 Furthermore, individuals reported their property
being vandalized “after their names were disclosed” for contributing to an
anti-union cause.120 The Supreme Court has recognized the reality of retaliation stemming from political affiliation and noted that attempts at intimidation, which were only able to be carried out as a result of public disclosure
laws, were a “cause for concern.”121
As the popularity of the internet grows, access to data on private individuals’ political donations is even more readily available and easily accessible. Cases before the inception of the internet warned of the widespread
dissemination of donor information and of the dangers that such easily accessible information may pose for those unprotected.122 Considering this, the
burden on free speech now certainly outweighs the danger of misuse, cutting
against any balancing test that has typically weighed in favor of the government.123 Courts cannot simply ignore the increased availability of the
information revealed under the compelled disclosure laws and the growing
trend to harass, intimidate, and retaliate against those who hold different
pollical beliefs. The ability to access these records is far easier than those
who passed the law could ever imagine.
When the compelled disclosure law was passed, records were only accessible in person at the Federal Election Commission headquarters.124 Today, records of citizens’ political contributions are maintained on the Federal Election Commission’s website, accessible by anyone, at any time, free of
charge.125 Justice Thomas has suggested that these online disclosure records
are maintained to “enable private citizens and elected officials to implement

119. McConnell v. FEC, 251 F. Supp. 2d 176, 227–29 (D.D.C. 2003).
120. Id. at 228.
121. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 370 (2010); see also Hollingsworth v. Perry,
558 U.S. 183, 195–196 (2010) (finding that petitioner’s concerns about public disclosure of
supporters of Proposition 8 were “substantiated . . . [because of] incidents of past harassment.”).
122. See, e.g., McIntyre v. Ohio Election Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 340–42 (1995); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 71 (1976) (both discussing the risks that may accompany disclosure
of an individual’s political affiliations to anyone who wishes to discover such information).
123. McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 357.
124. Compelled disclosures were required before the Federal Election Commission had a
website for maintaining and publicizing records. See Pub. L. No. 96-187, § 302, 93 Stat. 1339
(1980) (first establishing the disclosure requirement); see also Bipartisan Campaign Reform
Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107-155, Title V, § 502, 116 Stat. 115 (2002) (first requiring the FEC to
create and maintain a website twenty-two years after compelled disclosure became law, thirty-one years after the enactment of the initial Federal Election Campaign Act).
125. 52 U.S.C. § 30112(a)–(b) (2012).
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political strategies specifically calculated to curtail campaign-related activity and prevent the lawful, peaceful exercise of First Amendment rights.”126
However, focus on the enhanced burdens caused by the growth of the
internet alone undermines the fundamental constitutional issue that the compelled disclosure law creates. Even without the online database of donors’
personal information, the mere collection and publication of this information
in any form is constitutionally suspect.127 Concerns about the government
obtaining lists revealing individuals’ political affiliations arose long before
the proliferation of the internet.128 Though online publication of this information certainly increases the burden that politically active citizens face in
advocating for their beliefs, it is not a necessary factor for rendering the
compelled disclosure requirements unconstitutional.129
V. ANTI-BRIBERY LAWS BETTER SERVE THE GOVERNMENT’S PROFFERED
INTERESTS IN MAINTAINING ELECTORAL INTEGRITY
In general, campaign finance laws are premised on the idea that without limiting the amount of money in politics both the citizenry and the politicians will be unduly influenced.130 However,
[w]hen the Government defends a regulation on speech as a means to . . .
prevent anticipated harms, it must do more than simply posit the existence of the disease sought to be cured . . . [i]t must demonstrate that the
recited harms are real, not merely conjectural, and that the regulation
will in fact alleviate these harms in a direct and material way.131

More directly to the point of disclosure, when the government’s regulatory or administrative interests can easily be satisfied short of full disclosure, the government cannot force individuals to disclose their political beliefs.132
Federal law prohibiting bribery of elected federal officials already
serves as the best deterrent to corruption and is a perfect example of an easy
way that the government can accomplish its goals of maintaining electoral
integrity without trampling on the First Amendment.133 A federal law pro126. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 483 (2010) (Thomas, J., concurring in part)
(emphasis in original).
127. See Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60, 64–65 (1960).
128. NAACP v. Ala. ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 462 (1958).
129. See id.
130. Scalia Interview, supra note 68.
131. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 664 (1994) (internal quotations and
citations omitted).
132. See, e.g., Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 490 (1960).
133. See 18 U.S.C. § 201(a)–(c) (2012) (prohibiting “directly or indirectly . . . [giving,
offering, or promising] anything of value to any public official or person who has been se-
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hibiting individuals from bribing elected officials in an attempt to influence
the officials satisfies any compelling government interest of rightly keeping
elections free of quid pro quo corruption.134 Moreover, enforcement of federal anti-bribery law will prohibit actual corruption without risking the suppression of innocent political speech.135 These laws directly serve the function that supporters of the mandatory disclosure law claim will be defeated
in its absence.136 If the fear is that excessive political contributions are akin
to paying off politicians in return for political favors, then anti-bribery statutes will still address true instances of bribery.137 Under the current federal
bribery law, it is already unlawful for anyone to give money to a public official with the intent of influencing that official or candidate to do or not do
something in his official capacity as a condition of receiving that payment.138 The prohibition of bribery directly addresses the fear that the compelled disclosure requirement is claimed to address, and it does so without
impermissibly restricting innocent political speech.139 The “free functioning
of our national institutions” is not in peril by ensuring anonymity in political
speech so long as the bribery statutes are enforced.140
If a person donates to a specific candidate’s campaign with the intent of
influencing that candidate to perform a specific task when he or she is elected as a condition of that donation, that donor would face criminal penalties
under the bribery statute, not the campaign finance statute.141 Because the
government’s compelling interests can be satisfied short of disclosing donors’ identities, the compelled disclosure laws must fail a First Amendment
review.142
lected to be a public official, or offers or promises any public official or any person who has
been selected to be a public official to give anything of value to any other person or entity,
with intent to influence any official act; or to influence such public official or person who has
been selected to be a public official to commit or aid in committing, or collude in, or allow,
any fraud, or make opportunity for the commission of any fraud, on the United States; or to
induce such public official or such person who has been selected to be a public official to do
or omit to do any act in violation of the lawful duty of such official or person.”).
134. See, e.g., Annabi v. United States, No. 10-CR-007 (CM), 2018 WL 3756455, at *9
(S.D.N.Y. July 20, 2018) (denying motion to vacate conviction for bribery of a public official).
135. See id.
136. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 71 (1976) (discussing the government’s interest in
preventing the “buying” of elections as a compelling reason for disclosure laws); see also
Annabi, 2018 WL 3756455, at *9 (denying motion to vacate conviction for bribery of a public official).
137. See 18 U.S.C § 201(a)–(c) (2018) (prohibiting public officials from receiving anything of value in an attempt to influence an official act).
138. Id.
139. See id.
140. Cf. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 66.
141. See id.
142. See, e.g., Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488–90 (1960).
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VI. CONCLUSION
Threats of harassment, intimidation, and retaliation were paramount in
the Founders’ decision to secure protections for political speech.143 The fears
expressed by those suspicious of public disclosure laws are far from an exaggerated “parade of horribles.”144 As demonstrated, it is a reality for Americans holding minority or controversial political views across the political
spectrum. A burdensome law on a fundamental right like that of free speech
must only withstand a challenge if it serves a compelling interest for the
government and has been narrowly tailored to advance that compelling interest.145 The government, however, fails to overcome this level of scrutiny
with regard to disclosure laws.
Laws that are more narrowly tailored are already enforced and accomplish the goals that compelled disclosure is claimed to advance.146 Moreover,
these laws do so without a capacious restriction on individuals’ First
Amendment rights. A prohibition on compelled disclosure does not foreclose Americans’ ability to announce their financial support of candidates
publicly. Nor does it suggest that individuals will be free from discrimination based on their political views. It simply ensures that the government is
not unmasking the political beliefs of private citizens without their consent
and that no one is discouraged from participating in the political marketplace because of fear of reprisal. Accordingly, when faced with a challenge
to a law compelling the public disclosure of Americans’ political affiliations, the Supreme Court should not hesitate to invalidate it.
Scout Snowden*

143. See, e.g., Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60, 64–65 (1960).
144. The “parade of horribles” is a term first coined in Shapiro v. United States and subsequently used in a litany of court opinions to describe the often-exaggerated predictions
made by parties of what would happen if their arguments did not prevail. 335 U.S. 1, 55, 68
(1948) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
145. McIntyre v. Ohio Election Com’n, 514 U.S. 334, 347 (1995).
146. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 201(a)–(c).
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